主办：陕西省汽车工程学会
ISSN 1671-7988  CN 61-1394/TH
创刊：1976年
汽车实用技术

汽车实用技术 ›› 2026, Vol. 51 ›› Issue (16): 39-47.DOI: 10.16638/j.cnki.1671-7988.2026.016.008

• 智能网联汽车 • 上一篇    

面向集成 HSE 微处理器的安全启动设计

严捷丰 1,2，高正东 1,2*   

  1. 1.安徽博微智能电气有限公司； 2.中国电子科技集团有限公司 第三十八研究所
  • 发布日期:2026-08-28
  • 通讯作者: 高正东
  • 作者简介:作者简介：严捷丰（1978－），男，博士，工程师，研究方向为汽车电子、智能系统与信息安全； 通信作者：高正东（1979－），男，硕士，高级工程师，研究方向为实时系统、智能网联技术

Secure boot design for HSE-integrated microcontrollers

YAN Jiefeng1,2, GAO Zhengdong1,2*   

  1. 1.Anhui Bowei Intelligent Electric Company Limited; 2.The 38th Research Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation
  • Published:2026-08-28
  • Contact: GAO Zhengdong

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摘要： 随着《车载信息交互系统信息安全技术要求及试验方法》（GB/T 40856－2021）、《关于 车辆网络安全和网络安全管理体系认证的统一规定》（UN R155）和《道路车辆网络安全工程》 （ISO/SAE 21434:2021）等法规将固件完整性从可选功能提升为强制性要求，成本敏感型车 用微控制单元（MCU）在片内硬件安全引擎（HSE）密码能力受限的条件下如何构建符合标 准的安全启动方案，成为工程中亟待解决的问题。文章提出一种以 AES-128-CMAC 为唯一密 码学原语的安全启动设计方法，系统性地整合了三级 CMAC 信任链传递、密钥槽四域可信计 算基（TCB）隔离、基于密钥派生函数（KDF）的一机一密派生和 A/B 双分区原子回滚四种 机制。方法以固化 BootROM 为根信任，各级仅持有下一级验证密钥，TCB 收敛于只读存储 器（ROM）；启动策略与固件镜像解耦，以镜像向量表（IVT）头部承载并经一次性可编程 （OTP）锁定；升级采用原地保护策略，校验通过方切换分区，失败时原子回滚。在 RH850/R7F701581 平台上的实验结果表明，Bootloader 128 KB+APP 512 KB 配置下启动延时 约 106 ms，安全启动额外存储开销约 192 KB（占总 Flash 的 9.4%），篡改固件通过验证的概 率不超过 2 -128 。方案满足 GB/T 40856－2021 第 7.2 条及 ISO/SAE 21434:2021 Clause 9-13 的 核心合规要求，为成本敏感型车载 MCU 的安全启动设计提供了可复用的工程方法。

关键词: 安全启动；硬件安全引擎；AES-CMAC；一机一密；A/B 分区

Abstract: With regulations including Technical Requirements and Test Methods for Cybersecurity of On-Board Information Interactive System (GB/T 40856–2021), Uniform Provisions Concerning the Approval of Vehicles with Regard to Their Cybersecurity (UN R155), and Road Vehicles– Cybersecurity Engineering (ISO/SAE 21434:2021) elevating firmware integrity from an optional feature to a mandatory requirement, building a standards-compliant secure boot solution on costsensitive automotive microcontroller unit (MCU) with capability-constrained on-chip hardware security engines (HSE) remains a pressing engineering challenge. This paper presents a secure boot design method using AES-128-CMAC as the sole cryptographic primitive, systematically integrating four mechanisms: a three-level CMAC chain-of-trust, four-domain key-slot trusted computing base (TCB) isolation, key derivation function (KDF)-based per-device key derivation, and A/B dual-partition atomic rollback. The method anchors trust in immutable BootROM, with each level holding only the verification key for the next, converging the TCB within read-only memory (ROM). The boot policy is decoupled from firmware images, independently carried by an image vector table (IVT), header and permanently locked via one time programmable (OTP). Upgrades employ an in-place protection strategy: the new firmware is always written to the standby partition, with partition switching occurring only after successful CMAC verification, and atomic rollback upon failure. Experimental results on a Renesas RH850/R7F701581 platform show a boot delay of approximately 106 ms under a 128 KB Bootloader+512 KB APP configuration, with a secure boot storage overhead of approximately 192 KB (9.4% of total Flash), and the probability of a tampered firmware passing verification does not exceed 2-128 . The solution satisfies the core compliance requirements of GB/T 40856–2021 Clause 7.2 and ISO/SAE 21434:2021 Clauses 9-13, providing a reusable engineering method for secure boot design on cost-sensitive automotive MCU.

Key words: secure boot; HSE; AES-CMAC; per-device key; A/B partition